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FOREWORD 
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to 
attend the Naval War College. 
In this and subsequent issues will be found selected articles of 
value to all officers. Many of these articles will be outstanding lec­
tures delivered at the Naval War College and other service 
institutions. 
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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
IN ATOMIC ENERGY 
Rear Admiral w; K Parsons, U. S. 'f;v. 
Admiral Smith and Gentlemen of the War College:-
I think that the best way to start a discussion on problems 
and prospects in atomic energy is to cover a few basic definitions of 
Nuclear Physics. First, nuclear fission, which is induced in the 
nuclei of several atoms at the heavy end of the atomic series. The 
nuclear fission which concerns us is fission of the Uranium 235 
and Plutonium. nuclei. In both of these nuclei the disturbance be­
gins when a neutron enters the nucleus. .Since a neutron, by defini­
tion, has no electrical charge, it is neither attracted nor repelled by 
the nucleus, so that most impacts are penetrative. Immediately, 
after the neutron has penetrated a Uranium 235 or Plutonium 
nucleus, a major disturbance takes place in this very dense sphere 
of "jelly". The balance between electrical repulsion and sub-atomic 
cohesive forces is so upset that the sphere turns into a dumbbell 
shape, then the terrific electrical repulsion of the two . smaller 
"bells" accelerates them to very high velocities. As they break 
apart, each of them snaps. ba�k into spherical shape, . This violent 
oscillation of the. new nuclei results in ejection of"one or more 
neutrons by eac!i new nucleus. In about one percent of the cases, this 
ejection of a neutron is delayed for a time ranging up to a few 
seconds. 
The essential· properties of a mi.cleat fuel or . explosive are 
two : first, that it must be fissionable by slow or fast neutrons in 
the sense that I have just described; second, that the result of its 
fission must not 'only be the release of energy, but also the release 
Admiral Parsons is Director of Atomic Defense in the Office of CNO. 
Since' 1943 he has been closely associated with the atomic bomb 
project and .served as weaponeer in the Hirochima bombing, This 
lecture was delivered at the Naval War College on 14 September 1948. 
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of a sufficient number of neutrons to cause further fission. It is a 
scientific fact that the nuclei of only three atoms fulfill the two 
requirements which make them nuclear fuels. These three atoms 
are the 239 Isotope of Plutonium and two isotopes of Uranium, 
namely, Uranium 233 and Uranium 235. Two of these three known 
nuclear fuels do not occur in nature, and, therefore, must be pro­
duced artificially by transmutation. Plutonium is produced by 
bombardment of Uranium 238 with neutrons, resulting in Pluton­
ium 239. Uranium 233 is produced by neutron bombardment of 
Thorium 232 which results in Uranium 233. It is an odd and some-
. what ironic fact that to produce the two man-made nuclear fuels in 
usable amounts, it is necessary to "burn" Uranium 235, the only 
natural fuel, in order to get the astronomical number of neutro,ns 
required in the process. 
Up to now, I have casually referred to isotopes. I know 
from experience that many people are unfamiliar with the meaning 
of this Greek word. The term isotope is used to differentiate be­
tween atoms of the same element which have different weights. The 
chemical properties of an atom do not depend on the weight of the 
nucleus, but only on the number of electrical charges in the nucleus. 
By our present concept, this means the number of protons in the 
nucleus. Thus, there are three known isotopes of Hydrogen. Or­
dinary Hydrogen has a nucleus consisting of a single proton. Heavy 
Hydrogen, or Deuterium, has a proton and a neutron in the nuclous, 
whereas Tritium, or triple-weight Hydrogen, has ·a proton and two 
neutrons in its nucleus. 
Having disposed of nuclear chemistry, we now come to the 
term "critical mass" of fissionable material. An exact definition of 
critical mass would require several pages of fine print, but an over­
simplified one is all that we need here. There is no analogy to a 
critical mass in the case of chemical fuels or explosives. If there 
2 
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 1 [1948], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol1/iss3/1
RESTRICTED 
were, it would be impossible to make a sub-critical amount of TNT 
or coal ignite, but a super-critical amount would ignite spontaneous­
ly. For our purposes, a critical mass of fissionable material can be 
defined as the amount reached when the number of neutrons which 
escape from the surface is exactly balanced by the number of new 
neutrons created by fission within the mass. Obviously, an im­
portant factor in the critical size or mass ·is the number of neu­
trons released per fission. If this number were less than one and 
one-half for example, .the critical mass would be tremendous and 
the volume might exceed the size of this room. In that case, further 
discussion of atomic energy would be quite academic. 
Now, having defined a critical mass, the question of producing 
an explosion arises. My favorite way to discuss an atomic bomb in 
unclassified language is to picture two hams in a butcher shop. Each 
of the hams is sub-critical by itself. The flies in the butcher shop are 
the neutrons, and, as long as the hams are more than a diameter 
apart, a fly landing on either of them does not produce a chain re­
action which builds up. However, if the hams are brought together 
in some fasliion so that no fly lands on either of them until they have 
merged, there will be a real surprise when the next fly lands. In 
this case, we have surprised Nature by presenting her with a highly 
super-critical assembly. Nature then gets back at us by presenting 
us with a runaway chain reaction called an atomic explosion. In the 
case of an atomic bomb, there are two important time intervals. 
First, the assembly interval which involves mechanical movement, 
and, therefore, is relatively slow. The second interval is measured 
in fractions of a millionth of a second. It starts with the beginning 
of the runaway chain reaction and ends when the fissionable ma­
terial has expanded to a point at which it is again below critical. 
I would turn now to the effects of this atomic explosion. The· 
first effect considered is blast. We are all familiar with the destruc-
3 
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tive effect of blast from bombs with chemical high explosives. In 
these pre-atomic bombs, the blast is intense in the immediate vicinity 
of the bomb but is of very short duration. It delivers a hammer blow 
or very sharp impulse to any unyielding material in the vicinity. In 
the case of an atomic bomb, material in the immediate vicinity, of 
course, would be incandescent. At distances of the order of one­
half mile, the push of the shock wave and mass movement of the air 
lasts ten to one hundred times longer than the sharp push of an ordi­
nary block-buster. Therefore, it is effective in knocking down 
buildings and other structures which are built to withstand only the 
side pressure of a hurricane or the shaking of a mild earthquake. 
It is important to remember that a building has a tremendous 
amount of potential energy which is released when it falls on. itself. 
Then, if a falling building sets itself on fire, it proceeds to release 
a great deal of chemical energy. The point is, that an atomic bomb 
does not, by its own power, obliterate a city. It merely starts things 
and the city then obliterates itself. 
In the case of Hiroshima, the only effect of the atomic blast 
was to raise a curtain of dust about, 200 feet thick over the smashed 
city. Only one fire was visible one minute after the bomb detonated, 
and that was on a hillside. Perhaps some blacksmith shop had been 
knocked down. 
As Los Alamos was being organized, we did a lot of. talking 
about the explosion of an ammunition ship in Halifax Harbor in De­
cember 1917. That ship carried the equivalent of 2800 tons of TNT, 
and the explosion was reported to have had terrible effects on the 
city. We studied these reports carefully, butit w.as not until after 
the explosion of an ammunition ship at Port Chicago, in July 1944, 
that we became realistic in our estimate of blast damage. In the 
case of Port Chicago, which was an ammunition depot north of San 
Francisco, 1600 tons of high explosives detonated. I arrived at the 
scene less than two days later and made a personal check of the dam-
4 
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age, The Naval magazine at Port Chicago had built-in protection 
against large explosions. With some luck, this protection was ef­
fective in preventing any secondary explosions or fires. In - the 
light of the Port Chicago results, we reanalyzed the Halifax re­
ports and concluded that a major factor in the Halifax disaster was 
a record blizzard which struck the city a. few hours after the ex­
plosion. 
The results of Halifax and Port Chicago have been confirmed 
on a larger scale by Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Bikinf "ABLE". 
From these we can conclude that no spectacular blast damage will be 
done to tough structures like bridges, steel ships and heavy rein­
forced concrete buildings. Naturally, there would be a short range, 
say a few hundred yards, inside which practically any structure 
above ground would be rendered useless. 
·1 have already covered damage f!om secondary.fires. There
is a·further hazard from primary fires caused by the radiant heat of 
th� bomb. I do not believe that this primary heat hazard is very 
serious except to exposed people. While wood and other inflam­
mable material will char and smolder, .any flash ·fires are apt to be 
blown out by the violent blast which arrives withina second or so. 
A most import�nt factor in the lethality of an air burst 
atomic bomb comes from the radioactivity. In this case, the over­
whelming effect is from gamma radiation artd all of this radiation 
dosage is received in the fir'st few seconds after the bomb detonates. 
After this, the ball' of fire,.•has· risen so far toward the strato­
sphere that it no longer irradiates the dty. An air burst placed 
for maximum blast damage will not deposit arty radioactive ma� 
terial on a city. People within a mile of an air ·burst bomb, who 
have been shielded in some fashion from the radiant heat but not 
shielded from the penetrating gamma radiation will show no effects 
5 
9
Naval War College: December 1948 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1948
RESTRICTED 
for several hours. Then, if they have received heavy dosage they 
will become nauseated, and, in case of extreme exposure, will die 
within a few days. 1 Marginal cases will show ordinary infections 
within a week. These arise from the fact that the radiation kills 
the unborn white corpuscles in the blood, and, therefore, the �ody 
is unable to fight off normal infections. Red blood corpuscles are 
also affected, but their cycle of repla�ement is longer, so this effect 
shows up after several weeks. Combatting infection by use of 
Penicillin and replacing blood by transfusion in marginal cases help 
recovery. 
The semi-permanent radioactive contamination caused by 
· the underwater atomic burst in the Bikini "BAKER" test has been
given great prominence as the first sample of radioactive war­
fare. It is certainly true that the mist called the "base surge",
which was formed by the falling column of water, initially con­
tained the equivalent of one thousand tons of radium and deposited
an appreciable amount of this poison in the water and on the tar­
get ships. Such a. drenching would almost certainly have killed
most of the crews of the ships which were completely enveloped.
But, a most important point to remember is that the intensity
of the gamma radiation from the fission fragments of an atomic
burst decreases rapidly with time. Thus,' at the end of sixty min­
utes, the radiation intensity is perhaps one percent of what it was
at one minute. And, at the end of twenty-four hours, it has de­
creased to say one-thirtieth of what it was at one hour. It requires
very delicate instruments to record the radiation intensity in the
remaining Bikini target ships two years after the "BAKER" test.
If the Bikini "BAKER" test is a sample of. radioactive warfare, it
can be said that our experience .in handling the aftermath of an
atomic attack indicates that the principal difficulties are logistic
and administrative. By this I mean supply and replacement of
clothing and keeping complete records of the· exposure accumulated
by all men who work in contaminated spaces.
6 
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Since there has been confusion on this point, I would like to 
emphasize that Uranium and Plutonium do not give off gamma 
radiation, and, therefore, do not require heavy shielding to protect 
people in the immediate vicinity. For example, you could sit on an 
unshielded atomic bomb indefinitely without damage to yourself 
or your descendants. It follows from this fact, that no radiation 
detection instrument so far conceived would have any chanc_e of de­
tecting even an unshielded atomic bomb at a distance exceeding a 
foot ortwo. 
Up to now, I have discussed the uncontrolled chain reactions 
of atomic bombs. A controlled chain reaction in a pile or nuclear 
reactor involves us in many difficult problems which are skipped 
in the case of the bomb. The controlled chain reaction was used in 
the Hanford Uranium-Carbon piles to produce Plutonium. In this 
case, the neutrons were produced from the fission or burning of 
Uranium 235 atoms contained in the ratio of about 1 to 139 atoms 
of Uranium 238 in natural Uranium. The wartime goal of the 
Hanford Project was to transmute atoms of Uranium 238 into 
Plutonium, which is a different element. In this way, the newly 
created fissionable substances could be removed from the remaining 
metallic Uranium by chemical processes. Therefore, success in the 
Hanford Project was not dependent on creating a Plutonium atom 
for every Uranium 235 atom burned up in the process. Further­
more, the heat produced in the process was an unwanted by-product 
rather than something to be desired. Therefore, the fact that, in 
operation, the Hanford reactors produced a net decrease in total 
fissionable atoms, and also worked at such low temperatures that 
the heat produced was unusable, was accepted gratefully in ex-: 
change for usable amounts of Plutonium. 
In modern atomic jargon, the Hanford reactor is a negative 
breeder. A positive breeder would be one in which advantage is 
7 
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taken of the fact that more than two neutrons are produced per 
fission and an attempt is made to capture these neutrons· so effec­
tively in Thorium or Uranium 238 nuclei that the total number of 
fissionable atoms actually increases as the chain reaction proceeeds. 
' ' . . . 
The arithmetic of the breeding process is fairly simple-c--for an _in-
vestment of one neutron in a Uranium 235 nucleus you get out 
something more than two neutrons. Naturally, one of these neu­
trons must be reinvested to maintain the · chain reaction, and one 
more must be captured in a Uranium 238 or Thorium nucleus to 
replace the Uranium 235 nucleus which has previously fissioned. 
> The excess, beyond the two neutrons which came out of the fission,
would, in theory, be available for additional capture, and, there­
fore, creation of more fissionable atoms. So far, positive breeding 
cycles exist only in theory: They are, of course, recognized ·as 
tremendously important if they can be achieved in practice. 
The problem of designing nuclear reactors to operate at high 
temperatures is quite independent of breeding. In this case, the 
vital questions are chemical and metallurgical, and, certainly, for 
mobile power plants, the question of shielding against the intense 
gamma radiation and neutrons is of major importance. 
It is well to remark that generation of industrial atomic 
power on a large scale, in the absen�e of positive breeding, is not 
justifiable on the basis of national security. It would be a very 
complicated and expensive method of disarming ourselves by burn­
ing up most of our stockpile of nuclear fuel. In the case of pro­
pulsion of military vehicles, such as aircraft and submarines, 
there is a legitimate competition with bombs for the available 
stock of nuclear fuel. Furthermore, since the development of pro­
totypes can be prosecuted in each case without major expenditure of 
nuclear fuel,. there is every reason to proceed with the development 
of mobile pow�r plants for aircraft and submarines on an urgent 
basis. Then, when the developments bear f:ruit, the national 
8 
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economy of nuclear fuel, or the strategic situation with respect to 
employment of the fuel in power plants or bombs, may have 
changed. 
The problem of propelling a submarine by nuclear power 
is roughly a factor of ten simpler than nuclear propulsion of a 
manned aircraft. There are two major factors in this compari­
son; the first having to do with thermodynamics, and the second 
having to do with shielding weight. Submarine designers are quite 
willing to accept propellers driven by steam turbines, whereas, 
such a solution would be unacceptable to aircraft designers in this 
age of jet propulsion. · Therefore, the aircraft nuclear power-plant 
must operate at the high temperatures required by a turbo-jet 
system. 
In regard to shielding, it so happens that, while very heavy 
·shielding is required in the submarine reactor, this weight can still
be carried by the submarine, whereas, the same shielding weight
would make the airplane unable to fly.
Regardless of the technically dim prospect of achieving nu­
clear powered flight, barring some new discovery, the tremendous 
gain in milit�ry performance which nuclear power with its practi­
cally weightless fuel would give is ample justification for making a. 
well controlled and carefully guided major effort to achieve this 
goal. 
Another major problem in the atomic age relates to the 
amount of usable Uranium ore. In the present state of knowledge 
of mining and geology, high grade Uranium ore is extremely lim­
ited. Prospecting for high grade Uranium ore has gone on on a 
non-urgent basis for two generations simply because radium ce1uld 
only be found in Uranium deposits. The findings in this search 
have been that considerable deposits are located in the Great 
9 
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Bear Lake region of Canada, in ·Czechoslovakia and in ·the Belgian 
Congo. Deposits of low grade ore, in'. which the Uranium is a by­
product pf processing for other minerals, are distributed fairly 
generally throughout the world. But the impact pf the new de­
mand for Uranium as a. material of crucial importance has not yet 
produced major changes in the mining and processing industries. 
It is probable that during the coming generation the definition of 
economical and uneconomical in the mining of Uranium will be 
greatly changed. The changes will, of course, be affected by any 
new discoveries of freakishly rich deposits. 
Thorium is of secondary importance, although more of it is 
available than Uranium. The reason, of course, is that it is not 
directly fissionable, and, unless positive breeding becomes a reality, 
Thorium would not be of really great significance. 
Another problem in prospect in the atomic age relates to 
the phifosophy of design and development of atomic weapons and 
vehicles for their delivery. At least, so far as the weapons are 
concerned, security restrictions prevent much beyond generaliza­
tions. This is unfortunate because sound rational thinking in the 
field of atomic weapons depends to a considerable extent on elilni­
nating· mystery and black magic and getting down to what I call 
the "nuts and bolts" approach. Nuclear fission, neutrons and 
atomic bomb assembly designs are just as much plain facts of life 
of the modern age as are electronics and its application in radar. 
The philosophy of the wartime atomic bomb development 
assigned tremendous importance to the reliability of the bomb 
design and delivery system. At that time, and to a certain extent 
now, a mechanical or electrical failure of an atomic bomb which 
frustrated its delivery would be such poor overall economy that it 
should be avoided even at very large cost. 
lQ 
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Conventional military vehicles and weapons have been de­
veloped by a process of trial and error. The unique feature in 
atomic bomb development has been, and still is, the fact that we 
are permitted a microscopic number of trials and we allow our­
selves no errors. This thinking permeated our wartime philosophy 
and resulted in eighteen months of intense development activity in 
which full scale dummy bombs were dropped from B-29's under 
conditions representative of combat missions. As the development 
proceeded, the dummies more and more approached the real McCoy. 
For example, the 'final rehearsal of the -Hiroshima flight was a 
flight from Tinian to Iwo Jima and return to the vicinity of 
Tinian where a non-nuclear duplicate of the Hiroshima bomb was 
dropped. 
No' amount of attention and effort spent on the bomb itself 
could overcome weakness, in the delivery system caused, for ex� 
ample, by unreliability of the aircraft or its crew, opposition by 
the enemy, or unfavorable weather. Identifying and bombing the 
target by radar alone was not considered sufficiently reliable. It 
was part of our luck that, by the time enough fissionable material 
I had been produced by Oak Ridge and Hanford, our non-nuclear 
components were developed and ready, and a practically pe:i;fect 
ready-made B-29 delivery organization was available and in full 
, operation from the Mariannas to Japan. Under those practically 
ideal conditions of guaranteed efficiency of the delivery system, 
and absolute control of the air over the target, delivery became a 
demonstration. 
In my opinion, much fallacious thinking has been generated 
by the striking success of the first two atomic' deliveries. The 
effect has been to lead many articulate thinkers, including military 
planners, unconsciously to discount the effect of difficulties which 
-would plague future deliveries in manned subsonic bombers.
15
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In actual fact, the conventional long-range bomber passed its 
peak of effectiveness in 1944 with the. first appearance of the Ger­
man jet propelled fighter. The atomic delivery situation over 
Japan would have been entirely different if we had faced strong 
forces of German jet fighters over the Empire. I am sure that 
our approach to the delivery would have been entirely different and 
would probably have included heavy escort. 
Naturally, the speed of the delivery vehicle when it equals 
or exceeds that of our present jet fighters, confers an increasing 
amount of protection. Present thinking would concede practical 
invulnerability to a delivery vehicle which travels at more than twice 
the velocity of sound. 
The major limiting factors in the case of guided missiles 
are in propulsion and guidance· at ranges of significance to atomic 
bomb delivery. As I have indicated earlier, the effective radius of 
destruction of an atomic bomb is not so great that we can tolerate . 
errors of a mile or more in placing it on the target. This fact re­
quires achievement of a high degree of discrimination and re­
liability in the navigation brains of an unmanned missile before it 
can'. b� entrusted with an atomic warhead. The final choice be­
tween manned and unmanned delivery will always depend on the 
characteristics of the target, the defense, and the relative location of 
the launching base. 
Now to change from: purely material and operational consid­
erations to an examination of attitudes.. I was impressed through­
out the atomic weapon development period of World War II, say 
from 1943 to the actual deliveries from the Mariannas, with the ab­
solute, hard-boiled, realistic, and pragmatic approach of the scient­
ists. They refused to credit even their own best radar systems de­
veloped at M. I. T. with being able to identify a target city under 
difficult conditions. Even in the Gase of Hiroshima, which was a 
12 
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river delta with practically no similarity to any other seaport with­
in hundreds of miles, the scientists and military planners demanded 
visual delivery. The thoroughness of our preparations was shown 
by the fact that up to within two hours of strike time we had weather 
planes circling over our several targets. 
At the end of World War II, the attitude of our vocal 
scientists was abruptly changed from hardboiled realism and 
pessimism to a sort of mystic, uncritical acceptance of wild claims 
which they had been the first to dismiss during the war. If you 
have seen the movie "One World or None", which was put out in an 
effort to promote world government, you may remember the state­
ment in the ringing voice of Raymond Gram Swing: "The B-29's 
which delivered the atomic bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a 
range of 1500 miles. Within six months after the war's end, the 
range of atomic bomb carrying airplanes had increased to 6000 
miles!" That statement was approved for the script by some of 
the same scientists who would have refused to credit the B-29 with 
a range of 1800 miles during World War II. 
This change of attitude perhaps resulted from shock. I 
would illustrate further effects of this shock by quoting from an 
article by W. A. Higginbotham, in the New York Times, Magazine 
Section, November 3, 1946: " ______ no scientist sees any possibility of 
defense, for two main reasons : 
"1. Because atomic energy is the basic energy of the universe and 
its crushing force is all-powerful. 
"2. Because man will always make mistakes in the operation of any 
defense system." 
"Neither of these factors will change. There can be no defense 
against the atomic bomb". This quotation is a typical example of 
13 
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the sincerely motivated campaign of the atomic scientists, conduct­
ed throughout 1946 and the early part of 1947. 
Now I will read a comment on the effect of such a campaign, 
written by an expert in psychological warfare, who was in charge of 
the Psychological Branch of the Dutch War Ministry and a member 
of the Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group in England during 
the late war. This was in a letter to the New York Times, in June 
1947. I will read extracts from it: 
"The general idea in this atomic war of nerves appears to be 
that fear of another war and fear of the bomb's tremendous des­
truction will force mankind nearer to a constructive plan for peace. 
This idea, however, must be contested since, down through the 
ages, fear has been a notoriously bad leader of mankind. Too 
great a fear ends in one of two reactions, neither of which is con­
structive. 
''In the first place, such a fear can paralyze the human mind 
-hypnotize it, as it were, make it passive, ready to accept dangers
of war rather than bear the nervous tension of peace. In
Psychology we call it passive surrender to the thing feared.
"On the other hand, such a fear, which still works on the 
human mind as primitive fear did in the ancient world, can pro­
voke mankind to frantic explosions of aggression . When fear af­
fects men in this manner they try to deal the first blow-to cast the 
first bomb. 
" 
"The confused state of mind, resulting from this combination 
of post-war guilt feelings and the fears engendered by the atomic 
war of nerves, resembles ancient periods when people waited pass­
ively for the world's doom because of an undefined magic spell and 
14 
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mysterious fear passed on from general anxiety with which the 
world of those days we.re infected. In the middle ages this kind 
of mood spread along with the pandemics of the epoch ( the Black 
Death, Plague, etc.). 
" 
"During the hectic days when the Germans were success­
fully executing their war of nerves I thought that I had seen some 
deadly psychological warfare, but none of those attacks, I now feel, 
could out-do the atomic war of nerves to which we are being sub­
jected." 
In my opinion, this mystic attitude toward the atomic bomb 
has become dangerously widespread in the United States and has af­
fected the thinking of many intelligent people, including military 
'planners. The general idea seems to be that the potency of the 
atomic bomb somehow lends a considerable degree of invulner­
ability to its carrying vehicle, that the "absolute" weapon will be 
delivered. "inevitably" to the intended target, and that the results 
will be cataclysmic to the target. 
It is of crucial importance to our national defense that all 
of these shaky, unprovable assumptions be subjected to the most 
searching and skeptical analysis and test. It should also be re­
membered that whatever we know, or do not know, about the abil­
ity of our possible enemies to produce and deliver atomic bombs, 
they most certainly are aware of our capabilities in this respect. 
Therefore, if we are provoked into a war, even a Hitler will have 
anticipated and made reasonable allowances for our known ability to 
strike his key ·cities with atomic bombs. 
I worry when I see in the Saturday Evening Post of Septem­
ber 11, 1948, an article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, from which 
I will read an extract: 
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"What is novel in the new concept is the additional pro­
vision of a small, specialized offensive force, such as was not avail­
able to the democracies in 1914 or 1939. Only a minor percentage 
of total resources will be invested in this special force, which will be 
composed primarily of long-range bombers. But the bombers will 
carry the absolute weapons, and will have the mission of destroy­
ing the enemy's vitals in immediate retaliation for the first ag­
gressive act. By this destruction of the enemy's vitals, it is hoped 
that the general counter-offensive will become possible not after 
four years but after as many months. It is hoped, in short, that even 
if the deterrent fails, even if war comes despite all our labors to 
avoid it, the war may yet be short and the world we know may 
yet be saved. 
"In illustration of what one must pray will never occur, let 
us suppose that the worst has happened. War has begun after the 
new strategic concept has been implemented. Of the uncounted 
divisions of . the .Soviet empire, as many as can be rapidly trans­
ported-probably over 100-will be instantly launched across 
Europe toward the English Channel. The nations of the Western 
European Union will dispose their forty-five divisions on their se­
lected defensive line--most probably the Rhine, which is so distant 
from Russia that logistical factors will limit the first impact of the 
Red Army's attack. Fleets of transports will be gathered to 
strengthen the divisions of Europe with divisions from the United 
States. 
"As the battle is joined on land, the struggle for control of 
the seas will break out with fury, for the Red Fleet now possesses 
a formidable submarine force. Sabotage also will begin, of such 
character and on such a scale as will seriously impede the first ef­
fort of the West. 
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"Meanwhile, however, on the first notice of attack, orders 
will go out to the special offensive force. · From the United States, 
long trains of aircraft will fly, by day and night, to their pre­
pared bases across the Atlantic. There, at points beyond the im� 
mediate reach of the strong Russian Ground Arm, will be all the 
facilities, all the supplies for immediate air warfare, from run­
ways to hospitals, from gasoline to ammunition. While the vast 
Soviet Army is still grinding across Europe, the air missions will 
strike out-1800 miles, 2000 miles, 2200 miles-toward the targets 
of E,ussia. From Baku north to Leningrad, from Smolensk west 
to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet State will be scorched and 
destroyed with the terrible fire of the atomic bomb. 
"Soon, at the distant front, the disaster at the center will 
be felt. The Giant's arm will still be brawny, but he will be sorely 
stricken at the heart. As the arm falters from the heart's injury, 
so must the Red Army falter if cut off from all support except 
from the sullen satellites. And then the forces of the West, which 
once seemed almost too weak for defense, will of a sudden become 
strong enough for the attack. The change in relative strengths 
will permit a general counter-offensive by the Western Armies in 
which all will join. And the great war machine will be hurled 
back across Europe, along the road by which it came." 
Meditating on this extract, I think back to an article in 
Esquire Magazine for January 1942, which was already on the 
newstands on December 7, 1941. In it an American expert on Jap­
an included these as the clinching and last paragraphs of his 
article: 
"Japanese fighting men have proved their courage in suc­
cessives victories; their courage under a preliminary def eat is yet 
to be shown. They have demonstrated their fighting prowess 
against poorer trained and slower thinking people; they have yet to 
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meet a nation that can out-think them, as can every other nation 
today ranking as a first-class power. Those who know the Jap­
anese do not believe they could stand up in any vital test of the kind, 
except in defense of their homeland, when they could fight on their 
own terms on a terrain they know thoroughly and for the land they 
love. 
"As ·a menace to any country of any fighting consequence, 
Japan does not exist. 
"As a first-class power, Japan is a myt�. 
"The sooner this· fact is recognized, the sooner will all talk 
of war with Japan die away, to the betterment of the world and to 
the betterment of Japan." 
The warnings I have given are certainly not intended to 
belittle the atomi� bomb in any respect. They are primarily directed. 
toward a return of our thinking to the hardboiled, realistic kind 
which pr�duced the bomb in the first place. We have need of such 1 
thinking in these parlous times. 
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Gentlemen: 
RUSSIA 
Professor Hans Kohn 
What I shall try to do today is to give an historical back­
ground, trying as far as possible in so short a time� to explain the 
main line of Russia's development. All nations are determined in 
their actions and strivings by their past history. This is more true 
of Russia than of many other European nations for the very simple 
reason that, throughout a very long time, Russia led a very seclud­
ed life. The secluded life led today by Russia, its complete and en­
tirely . voluntary isolation from the outside world is nothing un­
known in her history, and this isolation, this seclusion, naturally 
increases the effect of the historical character of the nation. 
As you know, in the middle of the 19th century, Tocque­
ville, the French writer and statesman, in his famous book on 
American democracy, predicted that in the 20th century there 
would emerge two great nations dividing the world between them, 
one Russia and the other the United States (or as he called it, the 
Anglo-American) and he predicted that these two nations, arising 
simultaneously at the peak of their power, would show a similar 
vitality, and yet in all their ideas, in their starting points, in their 
methods, would be at the very opposite ends of human development. 
Tocqueville's predictions of 100 years ago have today been realized. 
· I think that in most ways the American heritage and the Russian
heritage are at the very opposite ends of the range of human possi­
bility and this polarity is the more striking because both races,
the Anglo-American and the Russian, have shown themselves to
Professor Kohn is a distinguished lecturer, author and historian. He 
was born in Czechoslovakia and lived in Russia during the period of 
the Bolshevik Revolution. He came to this country in 1931 and is now 
Professor of History at Smith College. This lecture was delivered at 
the Naval War College on 10 August 1948. 
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be great colonizing, pioneering races. You might say· that 
throughout Russian history you have one continuing feature­
that of expansion through pioneering and colonization. Froni 
the 11th century on, Russia expanded, and expanded on the whole 
into a pattern built on a plan. 
As you.know, what we call Russia today originated in the 
west, nearer to Europe than Russia is today. The first settlements 
of Russian Slavs were alo:p.g the trade route connecting the Baltic 
Sea with the Black Sea. Along this trade route, along these roads 
there grew up large urban centers not fundamentally different 
from Eu�opean urban trading centers. The most important among 
them, Novgorod in the north, Kiev in the south, were very near to 
what was then regarded as the centers of civilization. Kiev, on 
the Dnieper, was on the route to the Black Sea, to· Byzantium or 
Constantinople, to the Mediterranean, and to the seats of ancient 
great civilizations. On the other hand, Novgorod drew strength­
ening influences from the Scandinavian countries of the Vikings 
and from the German element of the trading Hansa. From Byzan"'." 
tium or Constantinople the Russian Slavic tribes received their 
Christianity; from Scapdinavia they received their ruling house. 
But they did not remain for long in contact with Europe. From the 
11th century on, these Slavic tribes expanded, expanded into wilder­
ness, into primitive forest lands toward the North_ and East. · 
In its future development Russian history was not deter­
mined by Kiev, not determined by what we mighf call its western 
aspects-its nearness to Byzantium and Europe. Russia's whole de­
velopment from the i6th ce�tU!Y on, was determinei by MoscOW-'­
a settlement in new colonial lands explored by Russian settlers who 
penetrated into the dense forests of northern and northeastern 
Russia where at that time Finnish tribes were living, intermingled 
with these Finnish tribes, and established new centers of Russia far 
20 
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 1 [1948], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol1/iss3/1
RESTRICTED 
away from contact with the west, far away from western in­
fluence. 
If you look at the map to determine where Moscow is, it is 
not on the Dnieper River. Moscow is not looking toward the Black 
Se�, toward ancient seats of Hellenistic civilization .. Moscow is on 
a small river, the Moskva, flowing to the Oka which flows into the 
Volga. The Volga flows to the Caspian Sea, an inland sea in the 
midst of Asiatic steppes. There are no roads from Moscow leading 
to the west. All roads from Moscow lead to Asia, to the immense 
steppes of Asia. 
Now as you very well know, this development of Russia 
away from Europe was finally consummated by. the famous Mon­
gol or Tartar invasion of Russia in the 13th century. Kiev was des­
troyed. The whole urban civilization of Russia ended, and for 
250 years Russia was dominated by the Tartars, by Russian princes 
under Tartar sovereignty. The Russians inter-married with Tar­
tars and built lip the Russian stock of today. 
At that time no roads led from Moscow to Europe. An en­
tirely different civilization grew up in Russia. What we call the 
common European experience--the 13th century Middle Ages with 
its knights and chivalry, with its flowering of the Universities of 
· Paris, Bologna, Oxford, Cologne and their high learning-remains
I ' 
unknown in Russia, nor were the Renaissance and the Reformation
common experiences for East and West. · When the modern Europe
emerged out of the Renaissance and Reformation there was no con­
tact whatsoever with Russia. Russia had no share in the discovery
of the humanities and in the rise of modern science. The connec­
tions between Russia and the West no longer existed as in the pre­
Mongol trade routes. Russia was no longer the eastern fringe of
Europe but was the western fringe of Asia.
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While Russia was in that way cut off from Europe, Moscow, 
one of the many Russian cities founded by colonizing during the 
period of European contacts prior to the Mongol conquest, emerged 
fo lead Christian Russia by the strength of its princes. I think 
it interesting to the student of history, to draw a parallel with Ger­
many. As you may remember, the old civilized part of Germany.is 
western Germany, the land along the Rhine, where the old German 
civilization flourished-but where did modern German power arise? 
It did not arise in western Germany, but in eastern Germany, in 
Brandenburg,' in Prussia, and in the eastern borders of Germany 
which until the 13th century had been Slavonic lands and which 
were then overrun by Germans-by German knights and settlers. 
Modern Germany has its political power-roots in the colonial ex­
pansion and conquests eastwaI,"ds. 
As German power became centered, not in the west, but in the 
east, in the newly conquer�d and newly settled lands through the 
strength of the great rulers of the House · of Hohenzollern in 
Berlin-so modern Russia arose, not around the Dnieper, not near 
the Black Sea nor the Baltic Sea, not near Europe, but in the newly 
colonized land that was Moscow, through a line of great princes. 
I wish to mention two of them, I van the III and I van the 
JV, who ruled in the 15th and 16th centuries, and whose imprint 
on Russian history remains until today. We may say that Ivan 
the III and Ivan the IV, both rulers of great capacity, shaped and 
molded the Russian pattern as it has survived until today. And 
if we ask ourselves, "What did these two princes accomplish?" we 
may sum it up in the following three statements: one, they over­
threw the Tartar yoke, the Tartar domination, and they liberated 
Moscow from Tartar political rule, but not from Tartar social and 
intellectual influences. The Tartar political domination went out 
but not its influence, the influence of the Tartar mind, and from this 
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m9ment on, the Russian prjnces, the princes of Moscow, turned 
.eastward to the Volga, to the Ural• mountains and beyond, and 
Moscow regarded herself-still regards herself as a legitimate heir 
to the Mongol empire, or if you wish to say it differently, to the 
Asian Empire. 
At the end of the 16th. century, Russian men, the Cossacks, 
who were colonizers, traders and soldiers in one, crossed the Ural 
mountains into Siberia--crossed an immense · distance from the 
Volga River to the Pacific Ocean. This was an immense achieve­
ment. It took less than 100 years for the Russians to cross the 
immense land of Northern Asia, and at the end of the 17th cen­
tury, not today nor yesterday, the Russians were knocking at the 
door of China. The first encounter of Russia with China dates back 
more than 250 years. If the Russians say, "We opened the Far 
East," historically they' are right. They preceded the British and 
the Americans by 100 years. There is one thing that happened 
and which was. never forgotten by the Russians: Asia had ruled 
Russia; now Russia was out to rule Asia. 
There are two other aspects which are more important to 
us and to Europe, and the second aspect which again happened 
. in the time of I van the III and I van the IV was something of im­
mense importance to the whole of western mankind. As you know, 
in 1453 the Turks captured Constantinople. We cannot understand 
what that meant unless we try to remember, that Constantinople 
was to all Eastern Europeans the seat of the Roman Empire and the 
seat of the true faith. Constantinople was the real Roman. Empire. 
If you remember reading Gibbons' famous history of the decline 
· and fall of the Roman Empire (the Roman Empire of which he
speaks was the only one which was the legitimate Roman Empir�
not that of the German kil!gs ,nor the Roman Popes, but the one of
Constantinople) you will remember that Constantine in 333 trans-
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ferred the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Byzantium, 
to Constantino�e. . And you will remember th
at at that time the
Roman Empire became a Christian Roman Empire. That means 
that the. old Roman Empire in Italy had been a pagan; a heathen .
. Roman Empire. The only true Christian Roman Empire was that 
of Byzantium, of Constantinople. · 
Now, you must again realize that until about 1400 every 
European, every civilized human being longed for the return . of 
the "peace and justice" of the Roman Empire. If you ever take 
the time to read what I regard the outstanding political treatise 
of the Middle Ages, Dante's "De Monarchia" you will find that 
the _whole thought of that time centered about the desire to create 
again a world government, a world order, because don't forget, 
what our modern world Federalists discuss, what our modern 
world government· people discuss, is not a new invention by them; 
it is a recollection of what one thousand years of European con-" 
sciousness remembers-a period when there was one world gov­
ernment, the Roman, and one world faith, the Christian. And 
Roman Constantinople, to all the minds of that time, was the 
legitimate seat of world order to bring back peace and justice to 
all of mankind. And now the legitimate seat of world order .and 
of world faith was destroyed by the Turks and on the most sacred 
place of Christianity, on Saint So�ia, the cross went down and the 
crescent weht up. That was something that shook contemporary 
humanity. Novv the question was, "Who would succeed imperial 
Constantino-ple? Who would succeed to. th.is role of bringing peace
and justice to mankind? · Who would succeed to the task of pro­
tecting and spreading the true faith-"orthodoxy"-against the 
deviations and the heretics of the west?" 
Now there was no doubt with the Russians that the center of 
the true faith was in Moscow, that they were called to this· mission 
and to this role: The Moscow princes, until then known as "grand 
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princes", assumed the title of tsar (and "tsar" means "Caesar"­
the legitimate heir to world order). Moscow became now, as the 
Russians called it, the third Rome; no longer the first Rome, which 
had been the pagan Rome of the Empire centered in Italy where now 
to them the "heretic Pope" was sitting; and no longer Constanti­
nople, the second Rome now dominated by the infidels or the Turks; 
but Moscow, the holy city, the third and final Rome. 
And now you must understand one thing about the Russians 
which is so difficult for us to grasp: the Russians have always been, 
and still are, a deeply religious people, religious extremists or 
fanatics, and you can't understand Russian Communism unless 
you envision the fact that the Russian£ never went through what 
we call the period of enJightenment of rational thought. Today 
these people still are deeply religious; they have regarded themselves 
and not without some justification, as the most Christian people on 
€arth. The Russians, a long-suffering, immensely patient people, 
who in their humility saw the mark of Christianity, regarded 
themselves, and again not without some justification, as carrying 
the cross and carrying it for mankind. What you find today as 
communism is only, in a certain way, a metamorphosis of this deep 
fanatical religious conviction that the Russians, and they alone, had 
the true faith. They have suffered for it and they justify this suf­
fering to themselves by a messianic complex: they have to save man­
kind. That is something deeply ingrained in the Russian mind 
since the 15th and 16th cent,ury. Moscow, the third Rome, is the
standard by which mankind will be ordered. To achieve this goal 
the Russians have to preserve their faith pure. _Its principal 
enemies, the unfortunate heretics of the West, will be exterminated, 
and Russian victory will be helped by the complete isolation from 
the West. The desire not to be contaminated by the heretical West 
was a deep Russian belief long before Marx, Lenin or Stalin. 
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The third thing that Ivan IV did (and you will notice that 
Ivan IV in history is called Ivan the Terrible, Ivan the Awe'­
inspiring, Ivan the Terror) was to exterminate all remnants of 
human liberty and individual rights in Russia for the sake of 
creating a stronger unity in Russia so that Russia might be better 
able to perform her mission of leading the. world. What he did was 
to destroy whatever remnant there was of what you might call � 
stratified society, and what .emerged in Russia was a complete lack 
of liberty and a very far reaching equality. From the time of Ivan 
IV on, and until Catherine II, the Russian noblemen, the most 
ancient Boyar families, had no more rights than the most abject 
serf. The Boyars and the serf were equally nobody before the 
Tsar, and there was only one will dominating Russia-the will of 
the self ruler,· the autocrat. Without being bound by law the men 
in the Kremlin were great and strong men; Ivan IV, like Stalin, 
ruled the millions of Russians giving them no rights whatsoever, 
and by this formed a monolithic closed-in community. These are 
the three innovations which came from Moscow. 
Then came the time when a highly gifted ruler of Muscovy� 
Peter the Great, came to the conclusion that this secluded Mu.c1covy 
was too weak in technology to resist Europe and he decided to 
modernize Russia as Stalin is now doing-not to bring the spirit 
of Europe to Russia, but to make Russia strong enough to resist 
and perhaps to overwhelm Europe. It was Peter's genius to recog­
nize that Russia needed a complete overhauling of her equipment, 
of her armor. Peter was the first modern man in Russia. What 
is meant by a modern man is a man who understands the importance 
of 'technique, of science. You know he went to western Europe 
to explore the techniques himself. He went to learn shipbuild­
ing. He created the Russian navy. More important, however, 
he tried to bring western culture, western technology to Russia 
-an immense enterprise, in which, by the way, he did not sue-
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ceed. The :people were much too backward to f oll?w his lead 
of genius. But he did one thing; he took Russia which had 
until then been looking eastward, and with immense violence and 
ruthlessness he turned her face westward. 
You know that at that time Russia was separated from 
Europe by three empires from the north to south, three great 
empires shutting Russia up-the Swedish Empire, the Polish Em­
pire, and the Turkish Empire--and through these three empires 
all roads from Russia to the west, to Germany, to Holland, to Eng­
land were cut. Peter decided to destroy these three empires. 
He succeeded with one himself and that was the Swedish Empire. 
His successor, Catherine II, defeated the second one, the Polish 
Empire, and opened the road to Turkey by conquering the Crimea 
and the shore of the Black Sea. The Russians, from this time on, 
endeavored to destroy the Turkish Empire. They have not yet 
succeeded; Constantinople is not yet in Russian hands, but 
throughout Russian history from 1500 on they have tried to get 
Constantinople, not for economic reasons (I'm deeply convinced 
that no great nation is driven by economic reasons into great ad­
venture) but because of this heritage, this tradition. In Russian, 
Constantinople is not called Constantinople but Tsargrad, the city 
of the Tsars; And maybe Tsar Stalin will reside in the city of the 
Tsars. 
Peter the Great began to bring Russia nearer to Europe. He 
acted the man of energy which he was. I wish to point out that 
Russia, which on the whole had rather mediocre princes, has had 
three men of genius, if you regard energy, resourcefulness and 
ruthlessness as marks of genius; Ivan the IV, Peter the Great, and 
Stalin. You· know that the word Stalin means "Man of Steel" 
and in that sense Peter was also a "Man of Steel". He decided to 
leave Moscow; Moscow was Asia, Moscow was a part of Asia and 
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he left it to found a new capital and the new capital that he 
founded, as you know, was St. Petersburg. Where did he found 
it? He founded it not in Russia, but outside of Russia, in newly 
conquered lands on the Baltic Sea, in marsh land where no Rus­
sian peasant had ever tilled the soil, where there was no memory 
of the Russian past. In an entirely new land he created a new city. 
You find an immense difference in Moscow and Leningrad. By 1931 
Moscow was still a widespread, sprawling Asiatic village around 
the Asian fortress, the Kremlin. And then ther,e was St. Peters­
burg, the modern European capital, beautiful beyond words, a part 
of the West, ,the imperial West, a real imperial city, thought out 
by a great planner and built by him. In Moscow you smelled 
Asia; in Leningrad you were in a city like Stockholm, like Edin­
burgh, like a northern capital. Peter the Great wished to change 
Russia, not in the sense to make her European in her mind and not 
to bring liberty to Russia, but to equip her with the "savoir 
faire" of Europeans, the "know-how" if I may use a word of to­
day. He wished to make Rus_sia into Pittsburgh, into Detroit, just 
as Stalin wishes to do-not to introduce the spirit of the West, but 
the technique of the West. 
For 100 years his European teaching did not penetrate the 
Russian people. Even under Catherine the Secorid it touched only 
the court aristocracy, but then came an event that ,changed Rus­
sia and that was the Napoleonic War. Not only did the French 
come into Moscow, but as you know, as a result the Russians went 
into Europe, into Paris, into Berlin. into Vienna, into Switzerland 
into the central part of Europe. 
I wish to make a side remark. During the war, iri Britain 
and in the United States, many people said, "Look what a good 
man Stalin must be because the Russians are fighting so well 
against the Germans," and the conclusion was drawn that the 
28 
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 1 [1948], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol1/iss3/1
RESTRICTED 
Bolshevik regime had really created a new loyalty amongst the 
Russian people. That's nonsence, because we know that in 1812, 
when there was no Stalin or Lenin around, the Russians fought 
a winning battle. Suppose we ask ourselves, "Who was the 
greater military genius, Hitler or Napoleon?" I'm not a military 
expert, as you know, but there is no doubt with me that Hitler's 
intuitions were not very good and Napoleon had behind him 20 
' years of military glory and military success when his grand army 
started its march into Muscovy. Yet Hitler penetrated much 
further into Russia and when he was stopped by the Russians, he 
was defeated by the very same factors which defeated Napoleon, 
namely, the immense expanse of Russia, the poor communications, 
an unprecedentedly hard and early winter, and the strong pa­
triotism, the immense stamina of the Russian people, then and now. 
In any case, when Napoleon was defeated and the Russians 
came into Europe, they began (and when I say they, I mean the 
intelligentsia, the educated classes,. and at that time, 1815 to 1830, 
the educated classes were made up mostly of the officers) to under­
stand what Europe meant, what liberty meant, what freedom 
meant. They saw European social life, learned European artistic 
expressions, and. from that moment on started a new Russian 
movement. We may say from this moment, from December 14, 
1825, the famous day when some of the regiments of the Tsar under 
the leadership of some officers rose to demand a constitution and 
started the first of the Russian revolutions-a revolution by offi. 
cers and aristocrats demanding an end to the lawless autocracy 
in Russia and demanding an introduction of European liber­
ty under law on Russia-from that moment until March 1917, for 
more than 90 years, the Russian intelligensia, the educated classes, 
fought against autocracy for a true Europeanization of Russia. 
They fought to integrate Russia into Europe, · to make Russia 
really a part of Europe and Europe's heritage, and these years have 
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an immense achievement to their credit. Russia and Europe met 
to a limited extent, but met for the first time really. This meet­
ing, this encounter, brought,to Russia the first penetration of some 
liberty into Russia and produced for the first time in Russia a great 
literature. 
Now look how under this first intercourse between Europe 
and Russia, 'how suddenly out of virgin soil there grew up a liter­
ature which was one of the greatest literatures in the history of 
modern mankind. For eighty years this literature enriched Europe 
by showing /new depths of humanity, new waves of feeling, and 
brought to Russia an entirely new type of culture which Russia had 
never. had before. Now, as you know, in March 1917, more 'than 
31 years ago, the efforts of generations o! Russians seemed to sue�
ceed. Tsarist autocracy was overthrown, and for the first time 
and for the last time in Russian history, for six' months Russia 
was a free country. All the old police state institutions were abol-: 
ished overnight. Russia was opened up to liberty under law. It 
was not to last, as you know. 'It came too suddenly; it came at a 
time when. Russia, exhausted by war efforts, 'was in a state of 
chaos, and the Russian masses were not prepared for it. Don't 
forget that until 1861 the Russian people had lived in serfdom. 
( 
Only in March 1861 was serfdom in Russia abolished, and 
serfdom was , something in Russia which included 78 % of the 
population. When they were emancipated in 1861, they did not 
receive individual property. No sense of individual rights or .of 
.. individual property could grow up so fast amongst the Russian 
masses. Only after 1907 there began to penetrate into the Russian 
village what we call free enterprise, individual rights and individual 
· property.
In 1917 Lenin's revolution came to destroy Russia's young 
liberty, not because there was too much capitalism in Russia, but 
because there was too little capitalism in Russia. In Rus-
30 
34
Naval War College Review, Vol. 1 [1948], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol1/iss3/1
RESTRICTED 
sia there was too little individual property, too little stake of 
the masses in the inherited system. In November 1917, under the 
leadership of Lenin, his closely knit group of Bolsheviks seized 
power. The Bolsheviks were not a party in our sense of the word, 
b.ut a closely knit group of conspir::ttors, a conspiracy for the sole
purpose to seize power by all means and to hold fast to it. The
Bolsheviks could seize power because they were not a party but a
, group, a military, militant group of a closely knit character, pre­
pared for one purpose and one purpose alone---to seize :power. 
They could carry the masses with them because the masses in 
Russia then did not care for a constitution nor for liberty. Lenin 
promised them peace and land. 
It should be said that the only freely elected parliament or 
national assembly in Russia (and Russia had only one in her whole 
history) was elected in November 1917. The elections lo this 
. Constituent Assembly resulted in a decided Bolshevik minority. 
When this Constituent Assembly met, it was the realization of the 
dreams of eighty years of Russian revolution and liberation. But 
the Bolsheviks made short work of "democracy". They sent in a 
group of drunken sailors and dispersed the Constituent Assembly; 
and the dream of Russian liberty, of the integration ·of Russia into 
Europe, into western mankind, was ended. 
And what you f.ind today in Russia is a new, secluded, 
isolated community--distrustful, hateful of the West, knowing and 
conscious that it is being called upon a�ain to spread the true . 
faith throughout the world and to "liberate" mankind from war, 
oppression, and injustice. To ,realize their Utopia, they believe 
themselves entitled to use any and every means to exterminate 
and to overcome all those who do not share fully their hopes or who 
deviate to the slightest degree from the narrow path which the in­
fallible and omnipotent autocracy and its infalli�le, omniscient 
leader orders his followers and all mankind to walk. 
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